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Abstract 
Approximately 75% of weather-related accidents result in fatalities and are a 
primary safety concern in aviation. This study attempted to understand how financial 
motivation and time investment influence the length of time pilots fly into degraded 
weather. The sunk-cost effect claims that financially motivated pilots would continue 
longer when weather is encountered late in the flight. The results revealed that the 
financially motivated pilots continued longer than the non-fmancially motivated pilots 
when weather was encountered early in the flight. These results support the situation 
assessment hypothesis and cognitive anchoring. Specifically, how pilots assess the 
situation and utilize information obtained before making a decision can influence their 
decisions. Further research is needed to understand this relationship to possibly reduce 
the number of weather-related accidents and associated fatalities. 
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Introduction 
Overview of General Aviation (GA) Flight and Weather Information 
Accident Example 
On January 31, 2004, a pilot and two passengers boarded a Cessna 414A in 
Honolulu, Hawaii and were scheduled to arrive at Hilo, Hawaii to pick up a patient. 
Even though weather reports indicated visual and instrument meteorological conditions, 
the pilot filed a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan. Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft 
crashed into trees and mountainous terrain located 21 miles from the destination, nearby 
Laupahoehoe. The accident investigation found that the pilot was current on all 
certifications and the aircraft logbook showed no reason for mechanical failure. 
Although the National Weather Service issued a weather advisory to all en route 
pilots to notify them of the hazardous flying conditions; the pilot elected to fly a VFR 
flight plan and ultimately flew into instrument meteorological conditions. The pilot's 
decisions resulted in the deaths of the pilot and the two passengers on board the flight, 
and became another data point in the legacy of weather-related aviation fatalities 
(National Transportation Safety Board, LAX04FA113). 
It is the pilot's responsibility to evaluate their experience and skill level as well as 
the performance parameters of the aircraft to handle the conditions while flying. 
Researchers have tried to answer the question of why some pilots purposefully or 
accidentally fly in degraded weather conditions, yet the data remains equivocal. The 
current investigation attempted to outline current theories associated with weather-related 
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aviation accidents, and test possible theories as to why some pilots fly into degraded 
weather. 
GA Background: Accident and Fatalities 
Many general aviation (GA) accidents occur every year and since weather related 
accidents are one of the leading causes of death among GA pilots, this leads to a primary 
concern for GA safety (Batt & O'Hare, 2005; Knecht, Harris & Shappell, 2005; O'Hare 
& Wiegmann, 2001). The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) states that of 
the 39,199 GA accidents that occurred between 1987 and 2006, a total of 7,611 were 
associated with fatalities. As shown in Figure 1, the accidents per year have decreased 
overall but the total number of fatal accidents have remained relatively constant (National 
Transportation Safety Board [NTSB]). 
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Figure L All General Aviation Accidents that Occurred Between 1987 and 2006. 
(From Table 10 at http://www.ntsb.gov/Aviation/Stats.htm) 
In Figure 2, the accident and fatality rate was computed per 100,000 flight hours 
for the accidents between 1987 and 2006. A downward trend can be observed for the 
2 
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accident rate while the fatality rate has remained relatively constant. These findings are 
consistent with the findings in Figure 1 that show over the past two decades the number 
of accidents has decreased while the number of fatal accidents have remained unchanged 
(NTSB). 
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Figure 2. The Accident and Fatality Rates Per 100,000 Hours Between 1987 and 2006. 
(From Table 10 at http://www.ntsb.gov/Aviation/Stats.htm) 
A GA accident can occur because of many of factors including mechanical failures, 
pilot error, lighting (e.g., daytime, nighttime), terrain (e.g., mountain, water) and weather, 
just to name a few (Detwiler, Hackworth, Holcomb, Boquet, Pfleiderer, Wiegmann, & 
Shappell, 2005). Too complicate matters further, these factors rarely occur in isolation, 
but rather in combination with one another. 
Weather Related Accidents 
While technological advances in the cockpit have made additional information 
available to GA pilots, weather-related accidents continue to plague the GA population 
3 
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(Wiggins & O'Hare, 2003). Every year, 5 to 9 percent of all GA accidents are weather-
related (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2005). General aviation has 
statistically shown that 3 out of 4 weather-related accidents are associated with fatalities 
(O'Hare & Wiegmann, 2001). These statistics are evident in the United States as well as 
other countries. Batt and O'Hare (2005) found that weather-related accidents are also a 
problem for pilots in Australia. Of the weather-related accidents analyzed from the 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 75.6% of the accidents were associated with 
fatalities. The high number of weather-related accidents shown by the statistics for the 
U.S. and Australia further illustrates the need to understand the underlying factors 
associated with weather related accidents. However, it is necessary to first understand 
what the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) considers a weather related accident. 
Visual Flight Rules (VFR) Flight into Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) 
Many terms within GA are used to explain different devices, rules, and conditions 
while flying. The terms visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and instrument 
meteorological conditions (IMC) are used to define the weather conditions that a pilot 
encounters while flying. The terms visual flight rules (VFR) and instrument flight rules 
(IFR) are the rules that govern flying through different weather conditions {Private pilot 
manual, 1997). The terms VFR and IFR are used to describe the pilot's flight path while 
VMC and IMC describe the conditions in which the pilot is flying in. It is perfectly 
acceptable for a pilot to fly an IFR flight plan into VMC weather conditions but it is a 
violation of FAA regulations for a pilot to fly with a VFR flight plan into IMC {Private 
pilot manual, 1997). 
4 
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A pilot can fly through VMC or IMC conditions by using VFR or IFR to navigate 
through these conditions. VFR or IFR consists of specific Federal Aviation Regulations 
(FARs) for cloud clearance and visibility requirements. If weather conditions are below 
specified VFR minimums, the pilot is required to file an IFR flight plan instead of VFR 
flight plan {Private pilot manual, 1997). In order to fly in IFR conditions the pilot must 
have the proper instrument certifications and a plane equipped with FAA approved IFR 
instrumentation. The ideal flying situation for a pilot is VFR with visibility up to three 
miles of visibility and a sky clear of clouds (Nail Report, 1998). A brief discussion of the 
established FARs weather minimums will follow as well as how pilots properly access 
weather information to make the proper decisions between a VFR and IFR flight plan. 
Weather Minimums 
There are two kinds of flying airspace, controlled and uncontrolled, which can be 
further divided into six flight classes. GA primarily flies in uncontrolled airspace or class 
G (AOPA, Air Safety Foundation). Each flight class has different weather minimums for 
day and night flights which must be followed for a flight to be considered VFR. For 
instances, a basic VFR weather minimums for a class G daytime flight is between 1,200 
feet and 10,000 feet including one mile of visibility with 500 feet below cloud clearance, 
1,000 feet above cloud clearance, and 2,000 feet horizontal cloud clearance (Federal 
Aviation Regulation FAR 91.155). For a pilot to be classified as flying in IMC, the 
weather conditions are classified as more degraded or lower than the stated VFR 
minimums. 
Source of Weather Data. Because flying occurs in a dynamic environment the 
5 
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pilot is required to monitor the environment for continuous changes. In aspects of 
weather, pilot must pay attention for the indication that weather is degrading to make the 
proper decisions to ensure safety of the flight. The pilot has the ability to access weather 
information through a number of resources. 
Before takeoff, the pilot must obtain a flight plan and a weather report. A computer 
generated weather report can be obtained through Direct User Access Terminal Service 
(DUATS), or over the phone through Flight Service Station (FSS). DUATS and FSS 
allows the pilot access to weather information before planning a flight, filing and closing 
the flight plan, and while making changes to the flight plan (Federal Aviation 
Administration [FAA], 1999) While taxing on the runway the pilots can affirm the 
weather report through Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS). ATIS is a 
report constantly verbalized over a particular frequency at an airport to provide pilots 
with information that is crucial to the safety of the flight. Some of the information 
provided by ATIS is information on active runways, airport call signs used by the pilots 
uses to communicate with the controllers, weather information on wind speed and 
direction, visibility, ceiling, temperature, dew point, and altimeter settings. Each report is 
given a distinct name (e.g., Alpha, Tango, etc.), which indicates to the pilots when a new 
report has been generated containing new information. The report is generated about 
every 45 minutes and is repeated until a new report is generated (O'Brien, FAA website). 
Even with specified weather minimums and a weather reporting system, pilots 
often find themselves flying into degrading weather comprising the safety of the flight. 
Some reasons why pilots fly into degraded weather exists in the literature and will be 
discussed further. 
6 
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Factors Associated With Flying Into Degraded Weather 
While researchers have tried to explain why pilots fly into weather, the data has 
remained equivocal. However, a number of factors have been identified that may 
contribute to why pilots fly into degraded weather. A characteristic necessary for safe 
flying is a pilots' ability to make the right decision at the appropriate moment. The flight 
can become very dangerous if the pilot encounters degrading weather and the pilot must 
quickly make the right decision. In some circumstances the consequences that can result 
if a pilot makes the wrong decision or makes the right decision to late is death. The 
decision making process is important throughout the entire flight and a description of the 
decision making process will be discussed as well as aeronautical decision making. 
Cognitive Approach to Decision Making 
Decisions are made every day dealing with ordinary to very important matters. For 
example, a person makes the decision to wear black pants over grey pants whereas that 
same person can later make the decision to continue flying into degraded weather or 
divert. According to Slade (1994), decision making is a process that encompasses a 
series of smaller decisions that occur within a process that can be broken down into eight 
discrete actions (see Figure 3). These eight actions include: (1) identifying the problem, 
(2) identifying the alternatives, (3) choosing a usual action, (4) evaluating alternatives, 
(5) choosing among alternatives, (6) effecting the choice, (7) generating new alternatives, 
and (8) abandoning problem (Slade, 1994). 
7 
The Influence of Motivation 8 
X 
Identify 
AUevtt&tjw* 
kkvratiihm 
<%oom Aw>««» 
UWHttVjVttS 
d M * 
„ ,„,JL,v ~ ™ ~ w , 
Effect j Hhmikw j 
<ij«iw { Problem ' 
I I 1 
Figure 3: Slade's (1994) Process of Decision Making 
(From Slade, 1994) 
Before action can be taken a person must realize that a problem exists. Once a 
problem is identified, appropriate alternatives (i.e., solutions) can be determined. 
According to Slade's (1994) decision making model usual actions can be identified as 
alternatives or effective choices that a person has used in the past that has proven 
effective in solving a problem. The established alternatives are evaluated based on the 
consequences and advantages as well as against the previous experiences the person had 
with the alternative. After evaluation, the alternatives are ranked and the highest ranked 
alternative is chosen. If any of the alternatives are ranked equally the alternatives are 
further analyzed for the best solution. Once the best alternative is identified, a solution is 
then chosen and put into action. In some cases all the alternatives are inadequate for 
solving the problem and a list of new alternatives is created. In the end, if no satisfactory 
solution is found, the problem is abandoned. 
C5tWM» 18 .A 
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Slade's (1994) description of the decision making process is a basic overview of 
the components involved when making a decision. Similar to Slade's decision making 
approach, Jensen's (1995) Judgment model has been used to explain decisions made 
within aviation or in the cockpit. 
Aeronautical Decision-Making 
Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model can be used to explain a pilot's judgment process 
when faced with making a decision in aviation. Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model is 
comprised of eight stages, which includes: (1) problem vigil, (2) recognition, (3) 
diagnosis, (4) alternative identification, (5) risk, (6) background factor, (7) decision, and 
(8) action stages (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model 
(From Wiegmann & Goh, 2000) 
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It is emphasized in the problem vigil stage that the pilot must be alert and aware of 
changes in the environment. The pilot obtains information from the environment through 
the human senses. For example, a person's vestibular, kinesthetic, tactile, and olfactory 
system aid in the identification of changes but the primary senses used in understanding 
the environment are the eyes and ears for sight and hearing. When a pilot becomes 
distracted they risk missing changes in the environment, allowing a situation to become 
dangerous (Jensen, 1995; Wiegmann & Goh, 2000). 
In the problem recognition stage, a pilot must recognize the current situation as a 
threat to the safety of the flight and the passengers on board. Whether or not a pilot is 
successful in identifying the risks is dependent on their perception of the situation and 
what they expect may happen. Often times our perceptual system delivers information 
through the senses to the brain to be interpreted but is processed incorrectly. The reason 
why information is processed incorrectly is because information delivered to the brain is 
in simplest form. The purpose of the simplified information is to allow for easier 
information processing, which speeds up the recognition of a problem. Because our 
perceptual system does not give a complete account of the situation due to 
misinterpretations of the information occur when our brain fills in the missing 
information. For example, in the corridor illusion the cylinders appear to be different 
sizes because our perceptual system places the cylinders in line with the context (see 
Figure 5). Our senses take the simplest message and our brain interprets the cylinders as 
different because perceiving the cylinders as the same requires more information 
processing and energy. Just like a perceptual error is made in the perception of the size 
of the cylinders, pilots make perceptual errors in aviation. A pilot may not perceive 
10 
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weather as dangerous and make a judgment error when deciding to fly VFR into 
degraded weather conditions (Jensen, 1995). 
Figure 5: The Corridor Illusion 
(From Jensen, 1995) 
In addition to perception, a pilot uses past experiences or expectancy to judge the 
likelihood of certain outcomes. Expectancy can be defined as the "thought patterns 
which tend to bias our interpretations of our environment" (Jensen, 1995, p. 41). A pilot 
reduces the level of information that needs processing by using past experiences to 
predict what will occur in current or future situations. As explained earlier, the 
perceptual system can lead to judgment errors, and aviation training that focuses on using 
knowledge, experience, and maintaining an alert state can counteract these types of 
perceptual judgment errors (Jensen, 1995). 
In the diagnosis stage, the pilot must gain an understanding of the nature of the 
problem before solutions can be created to fix the problem. When a problem is 
identified, the pilot must understand the current situation and how any change to the 
environment can influence the current state and the circumstances in the future. If a pilot 
makes an incorrect diagnosis the situation could become unsafe or even fatal, and 
unfortunately, pilots are required to diagnosis a situation very quickly (Jensen, 1995). To 
make quick decisions, a pilot can use understanding of past experiences with similar 
11 
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situations and knowledge of hazards to make correct diagnoses (Wiegmann & Goh, 
2000). 
In the alternative identification stage, the pilot identifies multiple courses of action 
that can be used to resolve the problem. The pilot must choose an alternative that will 
keep the aircraft and passengers safe by using a combination of creativity, knowledge of 
the aircraft, knowledge of the environment, and knowledge of the aviation system as a 
whole. In the risk stage, the pilot is required to associate the risks with each alternative 
based on a number of factors like the skill level of the pilot, reliability of the weather 
forecast, and the reliability of the aircraft. The background factor stage affects the 
judgment process by representing the influencing motivational factors that prevent a 
person from making purely rational decisions. Factors like duty, economics, adventure, 
commitment, ego, social pressures from peers, superiors, passengers, co-workers, and 
physiological pressures from illness and fatigue influence every cognitive decision the 
pilot makes (Jensen, 1995). 
In the decision stage, the pilot chooses a specific course of action and prepares to 
implement the decision. At this time, the pilot is about to make a decision that could 
result in negative consequences. In the final stage, the action stage, the pilot takes all the 
information about the situation, concerning the problem and appropriate solution, and 
puts the solution into "action" (i.e., physically and mentally) to solve the problem. As 
shown in Figure 4, a feedback loop is present in Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model. Since 
the aviation environment is dynamic, the feedback loop in Jensen's (1995) Judgment 
Model represents the iterative nature of decision making. Each stage is completed for 
one problem at a time, and after the solution has been implemented, the entire process is 
12 
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repeated whenever a new problem arises. A pilot does not make a decision based on the 
serial order of accomplishing these stages. Each stage is not independent of each other 
and can influence one another while making a decision. Jensen's (1995) judgment model 
is shown as a linear model for instructional purposes to understand the decision making 
process. 
Aeronautical Decision-Making While Flying Through Degraded Weather. A 
pilot must make a series of decisions when flying through weather, and the dynamic 
nature of flying requires pilots always pay attention. Many times pilots receive cues that 
weather is changing but continue to fly VFR into degraded weather (Burian, Orasanu, & 
Hitt, 2000). When pilots receive cues that weather is deteriorating and continue into 
degraded weather, it is said that a plan continuation event (PCE) has occurred. Burian, 
Orasanu, and Hitt (2000) investigated whether pilot's experience level (e.g., flight hours) 
and degradation of weather affected the number of PCEs committed. The results 
revealed that experience level played a role in the occurrences of PCEs. The pilots in the 
th 
lower 25 percentile for flight experience hours were more likely to commit a PCE than 
th 
the pilots in the upper 75 percentile for flight experience. It was also found that more 
PCEs are committed when flying into gradually degrading weather than weather that 
degrades quickly. The changes in gradually degrading weather are harder to perceive and 
can lead some pilots to misperceive weather conditions. Both experience level and 
perception of weather conditions may play a role in whether pilots fly into weather. 
Some factors according to Wiegmann and Goh (2000) will be discussed to explain why 
some pilots fly into degraded weather. 
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Wiegmann and Goh (2000) added four factors alongside Jensen's Judgment Model 
to help explain why some pilots fly into degraded weather. These factors include (1) 
situation assessment, (2) risk perception, (3) motivation, and (4) decision framing (Figure 
6). The concepts of situation assessment, risk perception, motivation, and decision 
framing have been associated with the decision making steps of Jensen's (1995) 
Judgment Model to conceptualize how these four factors play a role in pilot's decision 
making abilities when flying into degraded weather. 
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Figure 6: Four Factors From Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model 
(From Wiegmann & Goh, 2000) 
When considering situation assessment skills, Wiegmann and Goh (2000) state that 
according to the situation assessment hypothesis, some pilots fly VFR into IMC because 
14 
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they incorrectly assessed the hazards associated with the situation (Goh & Wiegmann, 
2002a; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001b; Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002). Reasons why a 
pilot assesses a situation incorrectly can include inexperience and poor hazard awareness. 
Inexperienced pilots lack the ability that experienced pilots have to quickly and 
efficiently identify weather hazards. A pilot who has more experience with degrading 
weather will identify weather changes faster than a pilot who has little or no experience. 
It is harder for a pilot to discriminate gradual weather changes, from minimum VFR 
conditions to marginal VFR and finally to IFR than in a situation where drastic weather 
changes occur. When weather degrades gradually, the pilot does not notices the changes 
and may fly into degrading weather without realizing that he or she has done so until it is 
too late. A pilot may also have poor hazard awareness and simply underestimate the 
hazards associated with situation. For example, a pilot with poor hazard awareness will 
consider weather as an unlikely cause of an accident and, as a result, fly into weather 
(Wiegmann & Goh, 2000). 
In addition to situation assessment, Wiegmann and Goh (2000) claim that risk 
perception or poor risk perception can contribute to why some pilots fly into weather. 
Risk can be defined "as the likelihood of suffering a loss due to a hazard" (Wiegmann 
and Goh, 2000, p. 3), A pilot may assess degrading weather accurately but underestimate 
the risk (e.g., crashing and/or death) associated with the situation. One reason why pilots 
underestimated risks is because a pilot may be overconfident in their abilities to control 
the aircraft. Pilots are trained to be confident in their skills and abilities and a by-product 
of this training, pilots may become overconfident and suffer what is known as confidence 
calibration. 
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Knecht, Harris, & Shappell (2005) describe confidence calibration as the degree to 
which a pilot's confidence level in accomplishing a task truly matches their ability to 
accomplish a task. The zero risk theory can be applied to aviation to explain the 
relationship between a pilot's confidence level and risk perception in a situation. The 
zero risk theory states that, "the perceived risk in a situation is the product of the 
perceived likelihood of a hazardous event and the importance attached by the individual 
to the consequence of the event" (Hunter, 2002, p. 1). What this means is that as a pilot's 
confidence level increases the perceived level of risk for a situation diminishes. A pilot 
gains experience through training in a situation the perceived level of risk for that 
situation diminishes (Hunter, 2002). 
Wiegmann and Goh (2000) claim that motivational factors (e.g., personal, social, or 
financial factors) can lead some pilots to fly into degraded weather. For example, a pilot 
experiences personal pressure to continue into degraded weather when the pilot wants to 
reach the destination (i.e., "get-home-itis") to spend time with a love one or family 
member. Social pressures to continue flying into degraded weather can come from the 
pilots' organization (e.g., time pressure, etc.) or from the passengers in the aircraft. In 
respect to financial incentive, pilots are only paid when "in-flight" and the decision to 
stay grounded or divert to an alternative airport is unappealing to the pilots and to the 
passengers. These pressures bias the pilot's decisions regardless of whether the 
assessment of the situation suggests otherwise. 
Last, Wiegmann and Goh (2000) claim that based on how the pilots view the 
framing of the alternatives (e.g., positive or negative) can lead some pilots to fly into 
degraded weather. Whether a pilot makes a decision between a risky or safe choice is 
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dependent on the decision framing of the alternatives. For example, when a pilot is faced 
with degrading weather and must make the decision to divert or continue whether the 
pilot views this decision as a loss or gain will affect his or her decision to divert or 
continue. If a pilot views the decision to divert as a loss of investment (e.g., time, money 
or effort), the pilot will take a risk-seeking outlook and make a risky decision to fly into 
degraded weather. On the other hand, if a pilot views diverting the flight as a gain (e.g., 
increasing flight safety), a risk-averse outlook will be taken and the pilot will make the 
decision to divert to a safe alternative (O'Hare & Smitheram, 1995; Wiegmann & Goh, 
2000; Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2001). As shown by the Prospect Theory Value 
Function (see Figure 7), the gain curve is much steeper than the loss curve because 
people have extreme responses to a choice involving a loss. If a pilot is confronted with a 
decision that could result in a negative outcome (e.g., loss of resources, diverting) the 
pilot may chose another decision to maintain that investment (i.e., continuing into 
degraded weather). 
VALUE 
LOSSES GAINS 
Figure 7: The Prospect Theory Hypothetical Value Function 
(From Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) 
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A pilot views a decision as a loss or gain in reference to their current position rather 
than the final outcome (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Because of this, a pilot will view 
the decision frame as a gain or a loss based on the proximity of accomplishing the goals 
of the flight. One of the pilot's goals is to arrive at the destination, and the closer the 
pilot is to accomplishing that goal, the higher the chance the pilot will continue into 
degrading weather. The pilot's decision to continue into degraded weather to arrive at 
the destination can be influenced by the sunk cost effect or what is known as "get-home-
it-is" (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002a; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001a; Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 
2002). The sunk cost effect is an irrational economic behavior that causes a person to 
continue participating in a task, even if continuing that task puts that person at risk (Arkes 
& Blumer, 1985). Once a pilot has invested resources in the flight (e.g., time and money) 
the decision to continue into degraded weather will be more likely, sometimes regardless 
of life-threatening factors. 
Jensen's (1995) Judgment model is one model that describes the steps involved 
while making a decision. When trying to understand the process involved in aeronautical 
decision making, situation assessment, risk perception, motivation, and decision framing 
must be considered and understood. These four factors were incorporated into Jensen's 
(1995) Judgment Model and are located alongside the appropriate steps (see Figure 7). 
Situation assessment is paired with the recognition and diagnosis stages and aids with a 
pilot's ability to recognize the problem and identify a diagnosis for that problem. Risk 
perception is paired with the risk stage because a pilot must identify the risks associated 
with a problem before the risks can be understood. The background factor influences a 
person's ability to make irrational decisions and many times motivation is a key 
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component that influences our decision-making. Depending on the type of motivation 
(e.g., personal or social pressures), these pressures influence whether we will make a 
good or bad decision. Finally, decision framing is paired with the decision step because 
the way in which the pilot views the alternatives, influences what decision will be made. 
In other words, the way in which the decision is framed (e.g., gain or loss) determines 
what the pilot will choose. Once a decision is chosen and put into action, the outcome 
from this decision may be very different than an outcome from another decision. This is 
why it is important especially in aviation that the right decision is made at the appropriate 
time. These four factors have an integral role in aiding or inhibiting a pilot's ability to 
make safe weather-related decisions and must be considered when analyzing the reasons 
why pilots fly into degraded weather. 
Focus of the Study 
Rationale 
Both motivation and the sunk-cost effect were investigated in this study and three 
hypotheses existed for the results. Because money is a strong motivating factor, half of 
the pilots were financially motivated by a bonus payment for reaching the destination. 
The remaining group of pilots did not receive a bonus payment and were not financially 
motivated to reach the destination. The pilots that received the financial motivator were 
labeled as being extrinsically motivated (EM) while the pilots that did not receive the 
bonus payment were labeled as being intrinsically motivated (IM). The purpose behind 
this design was to create a scenario that would encourage the EM pilots to continue 
longer into degraded, while the IM pilots would be more inclined to divert when they 
encountered degrading weather. 
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According to the prospect theory, if a decision is framed as a loss (e.g., time, 
money, effort, etc.) the probability of a pilot continuing the flight into degraded weather 
increases. According to the sunk cost effect, pilots will continue into degraded weather 
after an investment (i.e., money, time) has been made. The pilots that encounter weather 
closer to the destination or late in the flight will continue into weather longer than pilots 
who encounter weather farther away from the destination or early in the flight. The pilots 
who encounter degraded weather late in the flight have invested more in the flight and 
will have a stronger desire to reach the destination than the pilots who encounter weather 
early in the flight who have invested less (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002a). 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis One. It was hypothesized that a significant main effect for motivation 
would be found. It was expected that the EM pilots would fly longer into degraded 
weather than the IM pilots. 
Hypothesis Two. It was also expected that a significant main effect for investment 
would be found. The pilots who encounter degraded weather late in the flight (WL) 
would fly longer into degraded weather than the pilots who encounter degraded weather 
early in the flight (WE). 
Hypothesis Three. Last, it was hypothesized that the significant main effects would 
be modified by an interaction between investment and motivation. A significant 
difference would be found between the EM pilots and the IM pilots who encountered 
weather early in the flight. Overall, it was expected that the EM pilots who encountered 
weather late in the flight would continue the longest into degraded weather while the IM 
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pilots who encountered weather early in the flight would continue into degraded weather 
the least amount of time. 
In this study, a group of pilots encountered degraded weather early in the flight 
while the remaining group of pilots encountered weather late in the flight. According to 
the sunk cost effect, the pilots who encountered weather late in the flight would continue 
longer into degrading weather than the pilots who encountered degrading weather early in 
the flight. The pilots who encounter degrading weather late in the flight have invested 
more resources (e.g., time, money, and resources) in the flight and are closer to the final 
destination these pilots will continue longer into weather than the pilots who encounter 
degraded weather early in the flight or invested less in the flight. 
Statement of Problem and Research Question 
The reason for conducting this research was to better understand why pilots fly into 
degraded weather. Narrowing our focus, the research question that existed for this study 
was whether pilots would continue to fly into degraded weather longer after investment 
and motivational factors have been implemented. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample population consisted of 40 instrument rated pilots from Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University. Rather than using VFR pilots, instrument rated pilots were used 
as the sample in the study because it was assumed that instrument rated pilots had the 
experience level to recognize degraded weather. 
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Participant Demographic Information. After signing the informed consent form 
(Appendix A), the pilots completed the demographics data flight performance 
questionnaire (Appendix B) on background flight information. The following 
demographic information was gathered: (1) age, (2) number of hours flown in VFR, (3) 
number of hours flown in IFR, and (4) number of hours flown in technically advanced 
aircraft (TAA) (see Table 1). The pilot's VFR, IFR, and TAA hours were focused on 
rather than certifications since the pilot's flight hours is more indicative of their 
experience level than just certification level. For example, a pilot with a commercial 
aircraft certification was viewed as having a higher certification when compared to a pilot 
with a private pilot's license. Having the commercial certification does not necessarily 
equate to more experience than having a private pilot's license. The private pilot may 
have more flight hours than the commercial pilot but is viewed as less experienced when 
certification is considered alone when determining experience level. The data shows 
some variability because of a few outliers that existed in the flight hours reported by the 
pilots. 
Table 1. Table of Means for Age, VFR, IFR, TAA Hours (standard deviations) 
Conditions 
Early Weather (12mins) 
Externally Motivated 
Early Weather (12mins) 
Internally Motivated 
Late Weather (30 mins) 
Externally Motivated 
Late Weather (30 mins) 
Internally Motivated 
Total 
Age 
22.1(3.14) 
20.2(1.23) 
21.2(0.78) 
21.9(1.85) 
21.35(2.03) 
VFR Hrs 
243.5(145.2) 
207(90.31) 
303 (339.39) 
387.5 (439.06) 
285.25 (287.39) 
IFR Hrs 
34.8 (29.57) 
43 (59.26) 
51.9(29.82) 
37.8 (30.75) 
41.86(38.46) 
TAA Hrs 
57.9 (44.09) 
38(22.01) 
29.8 (24.39) 
85.9(58.38) 
52.9(44.31) 
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Design 
The experimental design was a 2 (investment, weather early and weather late) x 2 
(motivation, EM and IM) between subjects design, with the dependent measure being the 
length of time the pilots continued into degraded weather. The pilots were randomly 
assigned to one of the four conditions that varied in terms of investment and motivation. 
Investment. Half of the pilots encountered degrading weather after completing 
about 25 percent of the flight, or weather early in the flight, while the remaining half of 
the pilots received degraded weather after completing about 75 percent of the flight, or 
weather late in the flight. Since it was estimated that the flight would last for 42 minutes 
the pilots who encountered weather early in the flight experienced degrading weather 12 
minutes into the 42 minute session, while the pilots who encountered degraded weather 
late in flight experienced degrading weather 30 minutes into the 42 minute session. A 
description of the scenario used for the pilots who encountered degraded weather late is 
located in Appendix D, while the scenario for the pilots who encountered degraded 
weather is located in Appendix E. 
Motivation. The flight was designed as a life flight. The pilots were told they 
would be delivering a liver from Daytona Beach to Gainesville. The purpose of making 
the life flight was to motivate all the pilots to arrive at the destination. All of the pilots 
were paid 25 dollars for participating in the study. To see if an additional financial 
payment would motivate the pilots to fly longer into weather, half of the pilots were 
randomly assigned to an extrinsic motivation, EM, condition, which these pilots received 
an additional 20 dollars if they arrived at Gainesville. If the pilot decided to divert to an 
alternative airport during the flight and did not arrive at the Gainesville, they received 25 
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dollars for participating but did not receive the additional 20 dollar bonus payment. As a 
way to manipulate financial motivation, the remaining group of pilots did not receive a 
bonus payment for reaching Gainesville and were labeled as the intrinsic motivated, IM, 
condition. Regardless of whether the IM pilots landed in Gainesville or diverted, the 
pilots received 25 dollars for participating in the study. 
Time into Degraded Weather. The length of time each pilot flew into weather was 
measured until their diversion time or their landing time at Gainesville. For example, if a 
WE pilot decided to divert at the point where weather began to degrade, the length of 
time the pilot flew into weather until the pilot diverted was documented. Once it was 
indicated that the pilots diverted from the flight plan to an alternative path, the pilots were 
allowed to continue flying to an alternative airport to land. If the pilot decided to 
continue to Gainesville, the length of time the pilots flew into degraded weather from the 
point at which weather began to degrade to landing at Gainesville was documented. 
Before the analyses were conducted the length of time the pilots flew into degraded 
was restricted to 15 minutes. If the pilots continued after 15 minutes, their time into 
weather was indicated at 15 minutes and marked as continuing to the destination. The 
reason the 15 minute cutoff time was used in all the flight conditions was to hold the 
length of time the pilots could continue into weather consistent between the pilots who 
encountered weather early in the flight (WE) pilots and those pilots who encountered 
weather late in the flight (WL) pilots. This way the WE pilots did not have more time to 
fly into degraded weather than the WL pilots who had about 15 minutes of flying time 
after degraded weather was encountered. 
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Apparatus and Materials 
Simulator. The experiment was conducted in the Technologically Advanced 
Aircraft Performance (TAAP) Laboratory, using an Elite flight simulator (Figure 8). The 
ELITE flight simulator is a technically advanced aircraft equipped with a GARMIN 
interface. The GARMIN interface has a multiple functional display (MFD), traffic 
information service (TIS), and moving map, which was programmed by the investigator. 
The pilots were not allowed to manipulate any information on the moving display and no 
traffic information was presented. Microsoft Flight Simulator 2004 was the software 
used to operate the Elite flight simulator as the pilots flew the Cessna 172. The flight 
scenario was projected using a liquid crystal display (LCD) projector onto an eight foot 
screen located in front of the simulator. A stop watch was used to track the length of 
time the flight scenario lasted and the length of time the pilots flew into degraded 
weather. 
Figure 8: Photograph of the Elite system Cessna 172 simulation device. 
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Pre-Experimental Questionnaire. The pilots completed two questionnaires before 
starting the flight scenario. These questionnaires included the informed consent and the 
demographic questionnaire. 
Post-Experimental Questionnaire. After the flight scenario, the pilots completed 
the post-experimental questionnaire, the Federal Aeronautical Decision Making / 
Judgment Questionnaire (FADM/JQ). The FADM/JQ was modified by Blickensderfer 
and Summers from the Federal Aviation Administration Pilot Survey created by Driskill, 
Weissmuller, Quebec, Hand, and Hunter (1998). The questionnaire revised by 
Blickersderfer and Summers was reviewed for weather related scenarios and used to 
comprised the FADM/JQ (see Appendix C). This questionnaire assessed the pilots' 
decision making process through scripted weather related scenarios. The pilots were 
asked to read the questions and rank the likelihood they would perform each action on a 5 
point Likert Scale, which ranged from 1 meaning a highly unlikely option or unlikely 
course of action and 5 indicating a highly likely option or likely course of action. 
Degradation of Weather for Every Condition 
The entire flight scenario was created by a subject matter expert, which included 
the weather manipulations. All the flight scenarios started with the same VFR weather 
condition indicated as the initial weather setting presented in Table 2. These conditions 
were specified in the weather manipulation settings of Microsoft Flight Simulator. In an 
effort to make weather seem as though it was degraded gradually, the first change 
occurred early (12 minutes) or late (30 minutes) into the flight and the next two changes 
occurred after one minute intervals had passed. The changes from initial weather settings 
to the first degradation included a change from 10 miles of visibility to 5 miles of 
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visibility and a change from a cloud base of 8,000 scattered to 5,000 broken (i.e., from 
4/8 scattered to 5/8 broken in Microsoft Flight Simulator Settings). After one minute or 
at 13 or 31 minutes had passed, the second change from 4/8 broken to 5/8 broken 
occurred. At 14 or 32 minutes into the flight the third change from 5/8 broken to 7/8 
broken with a visibility of 3 miles was implemented. In total, weather degraded three 
times with one minute intervals occurring between each change. The one minute 
intervals were done to mimic gradually changing weather that often occurs in a real world 
flying situations. 
Table 2: Table of the Initial Weather Specifications and Changes 
Weather Specifications 
Ceiling: 15,000/base 
Microsoft Ceiling Setting 
Visibility 
Temperature (dew point) 
Wind: 
altitude, direction, speed 
Initial Weather 
(Start of Flight) 
/8,000 scattered 
Scattered 4/8 
10 miles 
23(15) 
6000,290, 13 
First Change 
(12 or 30 mins) 
/5,000 broken 
Broken 5/8 
5 miles 
23(15) 
6000,290,13 
Second Change 
(13 or 31 mins) 
/5,000 broken 
Broken 6/8 
5 miles 
23(15) 
6000,290, 13 
Third Change 
(14 or 32 mins) 
/5,000 broken 
Broken 7/8 
3 miles 
23(15) 
6000,290,13 
Regardless of condition, the scenarios called for two more weather degradations 
before reaching Gainesville. The second to last occurred as the pilot was passing over 
Palatka and the last was 10 miles from the Gainesville airport. The weather over Palatka 
was degraded from the third change by setting rain to moderate and increasing visibility 
to 5 miles and ceiling to 7000 overcast (see Table 3). Some of the WL pilots flew over 
Palatka before the initial weather changes allotted to occur at 30 minutes. These pilots 
did not receive the changes indicated to occur over Palatka and received the initial 
changes after 30 minutes has passed. If these WL pilots continued to Gainesville after 
receiving the weather at 30 minutes, they received the weather changes 10 miles from 
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Gainesville with moderate levels of rain being implemented here. All of the pilots that 
received the initial three weather changes received the weather changes over Palatka. 
Other than the changes made to some of the WL pilots, all other weather changes were 
consistent across conditions. Weather rarely changes immediately and stays constant for 
period of time. In effort to create realistic weather conditions, the weather in the 
experiment gradually degraded and changed a total of five times over the entire flight. 
Table 3: Table of the Last Two Weather Changes 
Weather Specifications 
Ceiling: 15,000/base 
Microsoft Ceiling Setting 
Visibility 
Rain 
Temperature (dew point) 
Wind: 
altitude, direction, speed 
Third Change 
(14 or 32 mins) 
/5,000 broken 
Broken 7/8 
3 miles 
None 
23(15) 
6000,290, 13 
Crossing Palatka 
/7000 overcast 
Overcast 
5 miles 
Moderate 
23(15) 
6000,290, 13 
10 Miles from GN 
/1500 scattered 
Scattered 5/8 
3 miles 
Moderate 
23(15) 
6000,290, 13 
Procedure 
In the first thirty minutes of the experiment, the pilots read and signed the informed 
consent and filled out the demographic questionnaire. The pilots were assured that their 
information would be kept confidential and should answer the questionnaires as honestly 
and accurately as possible. It was also explained that the pilots should not speak with 
anyone about any information they learned during the session with anyone else. This 
helped to ensure that other instrument rated pilots could participate without fear of 
gaining additional information that could affect their performance in the study. 
The pilots received a briefing form prior to the flight. The briefing form included 
information about how to operate the simulator. The pilots were informed that the flight 
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was a "life flight" and that they would be transporting a liver from Daytona Beach to a 
patient in Gainesville. The reason behind this design was to create a realistic need for the 
pilots to reach the destination. The pilots were then told that their flight was a VFR flight 
from Daytona Beach Airport to the Gainesville Airport about 42 minutes away. The 
requested altitude was indicated at 4500 feet and that their call sign to be used throughout 
the entire flight was "Riddle Life Flight 321". The pilots were informed that the military 
restrictive areas located between Daytona Beach and Gainesville were active and should 
be avoided. If the pilot was assigned to the extrinsically motivated condition, they 
received the information about the bonus payment when reaching the Gainesville airport. 
The pilots were then instructed that they could spend a few minutes looking over 
the information and when ready were instructed to get into the simulator. Once in the 
simulator the pilot was given the sectional and was informed where navigational buttons 
were located. Some of these buttons included the CDI, OBS, heading bug, VOR 
navigations, electric trim, and flap switch. The pilot was instructed to put on the headset 
located in the simulator to communicate with the air traffic controller (ATC) seated 
directly behind the simulator. The pilots were given as much time as needed to 
familiarize themselves with the cockpit before starting the flight scenario. Once the pilot 
put on the headset and programmed the radio stack, ATIS was read by ATC as well as 
clearance, delivery and tower. Upon completion of these steps the pilot was cleared for 
takeoff. 
Once the pilot initiated takeoff, the stop watch was started to record the time during 
the flight. The timer was used to record the entire flight time, time to encounter 
degrading weather (i.e., early/12 minutes or late/30 minutes), one minute intervals at 
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which weather was degraded, and the length of time the pilots penetrated weather (i.e., 
dependent measure). Based on random assignment, the pilots received degrading 
weather early or late into the flight. Weather was degraded three times with one minute 
intervals between each change. Two additional weather changes occurred, one over 
Palatka and the last weather change 10 miles from Gainesville. The pilots received these 
changes unless they flew a different flight that did not cross Palatka, flew over Palatka 
before the initial weather changes occurred, or diverted before these changes could be 
implemented. 
Ten minutes into every flight a "radio failure" occurred. The failure allowed the 
pilots to hear ATC's calls but made it seem as though ATC could not hear the pilot's 
calls. The reason behind the radio failure was to prevent the pilots from calling ATC to 
file an IFR flight plan when degraded weather was encountered. This forced the pilots to 
make the decision to continue the flight and deliver the liver or divert the flight to a safe 
location. 
The experiment could end in one of following three ways: the pilot could continue 
flying VFR into degraded weather which eventually turned into IMC reaching the 
destination, the pilot could crash before reaching the destination, or the pilot could divert 
from the flight plan and land at an alternative airport. All of the pilots successfully 
landed the aircraft regardless of whether they continued the flight to the destination or 
diverted. If the pilot decided to divert from the flight plan, the rater indicated this 
decision and marked the time at which this action occurred. Once the pilots landed, they 
were asked to exit the simulator and were instructed to complete the post-experimental 
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questionnaire. After the pilots completed the questionnaires they were told the reason 
why the study was conducted, received their payment and thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Exploratory Analysis 
The data from the 40 pilots was entered and analyzed using Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 14.0. The condition to which the pilots were 
randomly assigned and the length of time each pilot flew into weather was entered into 
SPSS. The dependent variable was calculated by subtracting the point at which the 
pilots encountered degraded weather (12 or 30 minutes) from the pilot's diversion time, 
landing time at the destination in Gainesville, or if the pilots continued past 15 minutes a 
cutoff point of 15 minutes was implemented to maintain a consistent amount of time the 
pilots were allowed to fly into weather across the conditions. An exploratory data 
analysis was conducted on the data to adequately display how motivation and investment 
influenced the length of time the pilots flew into weather. 
As shown in Table 4, the externally motivated (EM) pilots who encountered 
weather early in the flight flew an average of 12.79 minutes, {SD = 4.72), into degraded 
weather while the EM pilots who encountered degraded weather late in the flight flew 
6.96 minutes (SD = 5.41). The internally motivated (IM) pilots who encountered 
degraded weather early in the flight continued into weather for 7.55 minutes, {SD = 5.92) 
and the IM pilots who encountered degraded weather late in the flight continued into 
weather 8.56 minutes, {SD = 5.62). Based on visual inspection of the means, the EM 
pilots who encountered degraded weather early in the flight continued the longest, while 
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the EM pilots who encountered weather late in the flight continued the shortest amount of 
time. The two remaining groups continued into weather somewhere in between. 
Table 4. Table of the Time into Weather Raw Means (standard deviations) 
Investment: Encountered Degraded Weather 
Early (12 minutes) Late (30 Minutes) 
Motivation 
Extrinsic (EM) 12.79(4.72) 6.96(5.41) 
Intrinsic (IM) 7.55 (5.92) 8.56 (5.62) 
Levine 's Homogeneity of Variance. Because homogeneity of variance is one of the 
assumptions of ANOVA and indeed, most parametric tests, Levine's test was used to 
assess departure from this assumption. The results, F{3, 36) = 3.496, p=.025, indicated 
that the group variances were not sufficiently homogeneous, however the robustness of 
the ANOVA with respect to the violation of this assumption allows for meaningful 
results (Howell, 2002). 
MANOVA 
In order to assess the degree to which experience (i.e., flight hours) related to the 
independent variables a two-way multivariate analysis of variance was conducted on 
TAA, VFR, and IFR flight hours. The MANOVA for the three categories of flight hours 
revealed a significant interaction for weather and motivation, X (3, 34) = 3.82; p = 0.018. 
The univariate tests found that the interaction resulted from the relationship between 
weather and motivation for TAA only, F(l, 36) = 8.98;/? = 0.005. Since the main focus 
of this investigation was not flight hours, no simple effects were employed to decompose 
the interaction, however, TAA was used as a covariate in subsequent analyses to ensure 
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that any systematic effects of TAA on the dependent measure was held constant across 
the treatment groups. 
Individual correlations between VFR, IFR, and TAA hours and the length of time 
the pilots flew into weather were conducted. No significant differences were found for 
the correlations of VFR hours, r(38) = -0.222,/? = 0.17, IFR hours, r(38) = -0.154,/? = 
0.342, and TAA hours, r(38) = -0.268,/? = 0.095. When these three negative scores are 
compared, TAA hours resulted in the largest negative score. Even though differences 
were not significant, the negative correlations indicate that the pilots with fewer flight 
hours (i.e., experience) continued into weather longer than the pilots that had more hours. 
ANCOVA 
In order to assess group differences in terms of continued flight into degrading 
weather, a 2 (internal/external motivation) X 2 (early/late weather) analysis of co variance 
(ANCOVA) with TAA hours serving as the covariate was conducted. The significant 
result for TAA hours, F (1, 35) = 6.395,/? =0.016, indicated systematic variation of this 
factor across the groups supporting the use as a covariate. The ANCOVA revealed a 
non-significant main effect for weather, F(l, 35) = 1.357,/? = .252, and a non-significant 
main effect for motivation, F{\, 35) = 6.908,/? = .607. The non-significant results 
indicate that no differences existed with respect to weather and motivation. 
The non-significant main effects for weather and motivation were modified by a 
significant interaction between weather and motivation, F{\, 31) = 9.223,/? = .004 (see 
Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: Mean comparisons between conditions 
Simple Effects. To verify the mean differences noted in Figure 9, simple effects 
analyses were conducted to decompose the interaction. The simple effect analyses 
assessed motivation (extrinsic/intrinsic) at each level of weather (early/late). The 
analyses revealed that the interaction resulted from the significantly longer persistence of 
the EM pilots when compared against the IM pilots while encountering weather early in 
the flight, F{\, 35) = 7.46,/? = .01. No significant difference was found when the EM 
pilots were compared against the IM pilots when encountering weather late in the flight, 
F{\, 35) = 3.22, /? = .081. This implies that the manipulation of motivation and 
investment for the pilots who encountered weather late in flight did not have an effect on 
the length of time the pilots flew into weather. On the other hand, the manipulation of 
motivation and investment for the pilots who encountered weather early in the flight did 
have an effect on the length of time the pilots flew into weather. 
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Kruskal-Wallis 
The 19 questions from the FADM/JQ were assessed to isolate specific questions 
that dealt with in-flight weather-related decision making scenarios. A Kruskal-Wallis 
analysis was used to analyze the ranking scores on questions 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 
18. Specifically, the analyses were conducted to identify if a majority of the pilots who 
continued or diverted ranked any of the options similarly. The Kruskal-Wallis analysis 
revealed significant differences only on the likelihood rankings for 7b, H{\) = 12.037,/? = 
.001, and 18c, H{\) = 4.364,/? = .037. The significant findings indicated that differences 
existed in the responses of the pilots that continued and the responses of the pilots that 
diverted in the experimental session. A frequency count was done to identify how the 40 
pilots ranked options 7b and 18c. 
For question 7, a situation was described in which the first half of a four hour flight 
was slightly better than marginal VFR. The pilot departs and reaches a level altitude in 
VFR conditions and is ready to call in to check with Flight Watch. The pilot expects that 
while calling Flight Watch they will be asked for their PIREP. Option 7b states that the 
pilot informs Flight Watch they are to busy and can't take the time to report their PIREP. 
The significant difference indicates that differences exist on how pilots who continued 
and the pilots that diverted ranked this option as a likely course of action. 
A frequency distribution, (see Figure 10), revealed that a majority of the pilots who 
diverted ranked 7b as a one and two (i.e., an unlikely choice) while a majority of the 
pilots that continued ranked 7b as a two (i.e., an unlikely course of action). It should be 
noted that very few pilots ranked this option as a five or a likely course of action. These 
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frequency counts indicate that a large number of pilots who diverted did not take the time 
too report their PIREP, while the pilots that continued responded in a similar manner. 
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Figure 10. Frequency counts between the pilots that diverted and continued on the 
likelihood rankings for 7b 
Question 18 describes a situation where a pilot receives information from ATIS 
that the weather is below minimums at the destination. The pilot receives holding 
instructions while expect further clearance (EFC ) is one hour away. The pilot only has 
an hour and 15 minutes of fuel and the passenger urges the pilot to hold because of a 
meeting that can not be missed. Option 18c states that the pilot enters the hold and hopes 
that ATC can fit them in sooner than the EFC time. 
The frequency distribution (see Figure 11) for the pilot's rankings revealed that a 
majority of the pilots who diverted ranked 18c as a two (i.e., an unlikely course of action) 
or three (i.e., mutually exclusive course of action) with very few pilots ranking this 
option as a five (i.e., a likely course of action). The pilots that continued ranked 18c as a 
three (i.e., a mutually exclusive course of action) with five (i.e., a likely course of action) 
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being the next biggest ranking group. This means that a majority of pilots who diverted 
found the option to hold as an unlikely course of action while the pilots who continued 
ranked the option to enter the hold more appealing. 
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Figure 11. The frequency counts between the pilots that diverted and continued on the 
likelihood rankings for 18c 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis One. It was hypothesized that a significant main effect for motivation 
would be found. It was also expected that the pilots who received the financial incentive 
would fly longer into adverse weather than the pilots in the non-incentive group. This 
hypothesis was not supported since no significant differences were found in the length of 
time the pilots flew into weather due to the manipulation of motivation. 
Hypothesis Two. It was expected that a significant main effect for investment 
would be found. It was also expected that the pilots who encountered degraded weather 
late (30 minutes) into the flight would fly longer into degraded weather than the pilots 
who encountered weather early (12 minutes) into the flight. The non-significant main 
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effect found for investment did not support this hypothesis and the manipulation of 
investment did not have an effect. 
Hypothesis Three. It was hypothesized that the main effects would be modified by 
an interaction between investment and motivation. It was expected that a significant 
difference would be found between the EM and IM pilots who encountered weather early 
in the flight, while no significant differences were found between the EM pilots and IM 
pilots who encountered degrading weather late in the flight. It was expected that the EM 
pilots who encountered weather late would continue the longest while the IM pilots who 
encountered weather early would continue the shortest amount of time into weather. 
This hypothesis was partially supported when the non-significant main effects for 
investment and motivation were modified by the significant interaction between 
motivation and investment but the subsequent analyses did not support the remaining 
hypothesis. Based on the simple effects analysis, the significant results for the EM and 
IM pilots who encountered weather early and the non-significant findings for the EM and 
IM pilots who encountered weather late support this hypothesis but the overall findings 
do not support this hypothesis. The EM pilots that encountered weather early continued 
into weather the longest while the EM pilot who encountered weather late continued the 
shortest amount of time into weather. These findings are contrary to what was expected 
and some reasons exist to why this may be. 
Discussion 
Many models exist that can be used to explain the decision making process. Two 
examples discussed in this paper are Slade's (1994) basic overview of decision making 
and Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model, which has helped researchers understand the 
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mechanisms involved in the decision making process. Decisions are made everyday and 
can range from easy ones like what color pants to wear, to difficult decisions like whether 
to continue or divert when encountering degraded weather. Some of the factors that 
influence the decision making abilities of pilots' include situation assessment, risk 
perception, motivation, and decision framing. This study focused on motivation and the 
sunk-cost effect, as a means of understanding why some pilots fly into degraded weather. 
The sunk-cost effect claims that pilots who have invested more resources (e.g., 
time, effort, money) will be more likely to continue flying into degraded weather than 
pilots who have invested fewer resources. Once a pilot has made an investment in a 
flight, the potential for losing this investment will increase the likelihood of continuing 
the flight into degraded weather, even if the situation is unsafe (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1984). For example, accident LAX04FA113, presented at the beginning of this paper, 
supports the sunk-cost effect since the pilot continued the flight through degraded 
weather resulting in an accident associated with fatalities close to the destination. This 
accident example along with accident statistics reveal that many GA pilots fly into 
weather every year and, unfortunately, 75% of weather-related accidents are associated 
with fatalities (O'Hare & Wiegmann, 2001). It was because of the unforgiving nature of 
weather-related accidents that this study investigated the role that the sunk-cost effect 
(i.e., investment) and motivation play in pilots' decision making abilities when 
encountering degraded weather. The results from this study do not support the sunk-cost 
effect and some reasons to explain these results include flight experience, the situation 
assessment hypothesis, differences in perceptual processing, and cognitive anchoring. 
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One explanation for why some pilots fly into weather is due to differences that 
exist in flight experience (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002b). Experience levels or flight hours 
were investigated to see if a relationship existed between motivation, investment, and the 
length of time the pilots flew into degraded weather. Specifically, VFR, IFR, and TAA 
hours, were investigated and the significant difference found for TAA hours indicated a 
relationship between experience levels in TAA and the likelihood of continuing into 
degraded weather conditions. The individual correlations between VFR, IFR, and TAA 
while not significant, did reveal a negative linear relationship for all three variables 
relative to flight experience. Similar to what Wiegmann, Goh, and O'Hare (2002) found, 
the negative correlations indicate that the pilots who had more flight hours flew less time 
into weather while the pilots who had fewer flight hours flew longer into weather. This 
leads to the assumption that flight experience plays a role in the length of time the pilots 
flew into weather. Furthermore, the significant difference in TAA hours and the lack of 
significant differences for VFR and IFR hours indicates that qualitative differences in 
flight training experiences may have played a role in whether or not pilots flew into 
weather. Unsure of what exact differences exist in pilots' experience levels lend some 
pilots to fly longer into degraded weather but differences exist and further research is 
needed to fully understand this relationship. The significant differences in TAA hours 
between the groups indicated the need to include this variable in the principle analysis. 
Because TAA hours played a role in the length of time pilots flew into weather, an 
ANCOVA was conducted with TAA as a covariate, allowing for the assessment of 
motivation and timing of weather, absent the effects of TAA. The non-significant effect 
for motivation indicated that motivation in this study did not have an effect on the length 
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of time the pilots flew into weather. Individual differences could explain one reason why 
no differences were found for motivation. The 20 dollar bonus payment may not have 
been enough of a motivator for the externally motivated pilots to continue into degraded 
weather longer than the internally motivated pilots. 
Based on what the sunk-cost effect claims, it was expected that the pilots who 
encountered weather late in a flight invested more resources than pilots who encountered 
weather early in a flight. Further, it was anticipated that the EM pilots who encountered 
weather late in the flight would continue longer into degraded weather, while the IM 
pilots who encountered weather early in the flight would continue a shorter amount of 
time. The results from this study found that the pilots that received weather early in the 
flight continued longer into degraded weather than the pilots that received weather late in 
the flight. The significant simple effects analysis revealed that the EM pilots continued 
significantly longer than the IM pilot who encountered weather early in the flight, while 
not differences were found in the length of time the EM and IM pilot flew into weather 
when encountering weather late in the flight. A study conducted by Wiegmann, Goh and 
O'Hare (2001) and the results from this study support these findings. Wiegmann, Goh 
and O'Hare (2001) in a similar study instructed a group of pilots to fly a cross-country 
flight where half received degrading weather early while the other half received 
degrading weather late. The results from this study revealed that the pilots that 
encountered weather early in the flight continued longer and farther into to weather than 
the pilots that encountered weather late in the flight. These results do not support the 
claims made by the sunk-cost effect, but are supported by the situation assessment 
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hypothesis, differences in perceptual processing, decision making, and cognitive 
anchoring. 
The situation assessment hypothesis states that pilots who encounter weather early 
in the flight continue into weather because they do not accurately assess degrading 
weather. This inaccurate assessment of degrading weather leads pilots to fly into weather 
without realizing they are doing so (Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002). Just as the sunk-
cost effect is a possible explanation for why pilots fly into degrading weather, the 
situation assessment hypothesis and the weather location effect are possible explanations 
supported by the results found in this study of why pilots fly into weather. 
It is understood that pilots with more experience should be more effective and 
efficient in identifying degrading weather than pilots with less experience. Burian, 
Orasanu, and Hitt (2000) found that pilots with less experience continued into weather 
longer because they did not "trust" their perception of degrading weather and continued 
flying "blindly" into degrading weather. In addition to experience in assessing degrading 
weather, the location at which pilots encounter weather, the weather location effect, 
influences the length of time pilots fly into weather. The degrading weather the pilots 
encountered early in the flight contradicts what the pilots expected weather to be like 
based upon reports received prior to takeoff. Because of this contradiction, the pilots 
"look around" to resolve the disparity between the weather report previously obtained 
and the degrading weather encountering early in the flight. This behavior to "look 
around" may lead the pilots who encounter weather early in the flight to fly longer into 
weather than the pilots who encounter weather late in the flight. The pilots that encounter 
weather later in the flight assume that the weather report obtained before takeoff is 
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outdated and make their decision based on the weather condition currently experiencing 
(Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002). The ability for the pilots to realize that the weather 
report is outdated may contribute to less flight time into degrading weather than the pilots 
who encounter weather early in the flight. 
In addition to the situation assessment hypothesis, differences in perceptual 
processes could explain why pilots who encountered weather early in the flight continued 
into weather longer than the pilots who encountered weather late in the flight. It is easier 
for pilots to perceive weather changes after a long period of exposure to consistent 
weather than it is for pilots who have been exposed to consistent weather for a shorter 
period of time. The pilots who encountered weather late in the flight were exposed to a 
long period of constant weather which allowed the pilots to notice changes in degrading 
weather quicker. On the other hand, the pilots who encountered weather early in the 
flight had a shorter period of consistent weather to compare against the weather changes. 
The less time the pilots are exposed to the weather conditions before the weather changes 
occur may contribute to longer flight into degrading weather when deciding if the 
weather conditions are degrading enough to divert (Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002). 
Differences in the pilots' decision making may contribute to flight into degrading 
weather. Specifically, the differences that existed in the length of time the pilots who 
continued and the pilots who diverted can be attributed to differences in-flight weather-
related decision making. To investigate whether differences were present between the 
pilots that continued and diverted, the likelihood rankings for the weather-related scripted 
scenarios were analyzed from the FADM/JQ. 
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For the responses on 7b, overall, the pilots ranked the option of telling Flight 
Watch that they are too busy to give them their PIREP in marginal VFR conditions as an 
unlikely course of action. More of the pilots that diverted ranked this option as an 
unlikely course of action while some of the pilots that continue ranked this option as a 
likely course of action. When the pilots encountered degrading weather, the pilots that 
continued may have been more focused on what was going on in their environment and 
trying to decide whether to continue and did not have the time to inform Flight Watch of 
their PIREP. The pilots that diverted had already made the decision and were more likely 
to give their PIREP to Flight Watch. 
In the responses for 18c, the pilots that diverted ranked the option to enter the hold 
in below weather minimums in hopes to land before the EFC time as an unlikely course 
of action. With the pilots that continued, this response was ranked somewhere in the 
middle between an unlikely course of action and a likely course of action. Furthermore, 
more pilots that continued ranked this option as a likely course of action than the pilots 
that diverted and more pilots that diverted ranked this option as an unlikely course of 
action than the pilots that continued. These responses indicated that the pilots who 
diverted were less likely to enter a hold and wait in compromising conditions than the 
pilots that continued. The responses to these items indicate differences in weather-related 
decision making while supporting the outcomes of this investigation. 
For pilots to make the best possible decision under uncertainty, an accurate 
assessment of the situation is required usually requiring the pilots to spend time assessing 
the situation before making the decision. Any information the pilot gains prior to making 
a decision may bias his or her decision in favor of that information. Madhavan and 
44 
The Influence of Motivation 45 
Wiegmann (2005) label this behavior as cognitive anchoring which has an effect on a 
person's ability to make decisions under uncertainty. For example, when a person is 
asked to estimate if Daytona Beach, Florida has less or more than 50,000 people and then 
asked to estimate the actual number of people living in Daytona Beach. Their estimation 
of the actual number of people living in Daytona Beach is closely related or "anchored" 
to the original estimation on whether they though there were less than or more than 
50,000 people (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). In this study, the pilots that received weather 
early in the flight may have continued into weather longer than those who received 
weather late in the flight because of cognitive anchoring. 
How cognitive anchoring incorporates into Jensen's (1995) Judgment Model can 
help explain why pilots in this study who encountered weather early in the flight 
continued longer into weather than the pilots who encountered weather late in the flight. 
Pilots gain information and create a hypothesis about the weather condition for the flight 
from the weather report obtained prior to takeoff. The pilots use the weather information 
obtained from the weather report as an "anchor" to make comparative assessments of the 
weather conditions throughout the entire flight, the problem vigil stage. Specifically, 
when degrading weather is encountered early in the flight the pilots are biased towards 
the initial hypothesis or "anchor" established from the weather report. Because of this, 
the pilots do not easily or quickly accept an alternative "anchor", the degraded weather, 
but rather have a stronger tendency to favor the original anchor, the weather report. This 
may lead pilots to fly into weather longer until the "anchor" is changed or according to 
the situation assessment hypothesis the disparity is resolved. The pilots who encounter 
weather late in the flight are less influenced by the "anchor" of the weather report 
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because it is outdated and are more open to changing this "anchor". Thus, how pilots are 
cognitively "anchored" may influence the length of time pilots fly into weather before 
diverting. This may be compounded by that fact that pilots who encountered weather 
early in the flight had more time to evaluate the situation before pressed to make the 
decision, possibly leading to longer flight into degraded weather. The pilots who 
received weather late in the flight were required to make the decision to continue or 
divert much quicker than the pilots who received weather early in the flight (Goh and 
Wiegmann, 2001a). 
The limitations of this study included the use of a simulator, the familiarity with the 
flight route, inconsistencies with the weather specifications and how the equipment could 
display them, and the lack of influence the bonus payment had in the external motivation 
condition. This study was conducted in a flight simulator rather than in an actual aircraft 
and differences in the pilots' performance could exist between these two environments. 
One of the risks with conducting research in a simulator is the possibility that the pilots 
may have been "performing" for the investigator. This may not have been the case since 
the purpose of the study was concealed until after the flight scenario was completed, but 
this issue must not be dismissed. Since all the pilots were from Daytona Beach the flight 
route from Daytona Beach to Gainesville may have been a familiar one. Since the flight 
was in Florida the terrain was very flat allowing the pilots to descend to around 1500 feet 
and continue flying to Gainesville. The combination of familiarity with the flight and the 
level terrain may have had an influence on the number of pilots that continued the entire 
way to the destination. One problem with the equipment is how the weather 
specifications indicated in Microsoft Flight Simulator were not projected exactly as 
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entered. Weather was perceived as better than what was actually indicated on the control 
panel and presented in the weather manipulating section of Microsoft Flight Simulator. 
Last, the bonus payment used for the extrinsic motivation condition was not effective in 
motivating the pilots to continue to the destination. Some of the pilots may have viewed 
the payment as insufficient to compromise the safety of the flight. Even with these 
limitations, some of the pilots continued through degraded weather indicating the weather 
was ambiguous enough the allow them to continue, while some of the pilots diverted 
during the experiment indicating the weather conditions were bad enough to cause these 
pilots to divert. 
Conclusion 
The statistics support that weather-related accidents are one of GA's primary safety 
concerns, especially since many weather-related accidents are associated with fatalities. 
Many factors encourage pilots to fly into degraded weather and the purpose of this study 
was to assess how motivation and investment relate to the length of time pilots fly into 
degraded weather. While the intent was to frame the investigation within the sunk-cost 
effect, the findings point in another direction. Originally it was thought that the pilots 
who encountered weather late in the flight would continue the longest into degraded 
weather, but instead, through this study it was found that the pilots who received weather 
early in the flight continued longer into degraded weather than the pilots who 
encountered weather later. To understand why pilots fly into weather, decisions made in 
weather scenarios were analyzed. The decision making analysis was conducted to better 
understand how pilots make decisions to continue or divert into degraded weather, but 
unfortunately, the findings do not fully explain why pilots fly into weather. It may prove 
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beneficial to research what motivates pilots to make the decision to fly into weather. 
Some motivational factors could include the situation assessment hypothesis, perceptual 
processing differences, and differences in cognitive anchoring. In addition to 
understanding how pilots perceive degrading weather (situation assessment hypothesis) 
or where weather is encountered (weather location effect), the way in which pilots view 
the decision to continue or divert against information he or she already knows, (cognitive 
anchoring) may influence the length of time pilots fly into degraded weather. With better 
understanding of these factors it may be possible to identify effective interventions to 
reduce the number of pilots that fly into degraded weather with hopes of reducing the 
accidents and fatality numbers associated with weather-related accidents. 
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Appendix A: Informed Consent Form 
I consent to participating in the research project entitled: 
Flight Research for ADS-B Implementation 
The principle investigator of the study is: 
Jon French x 386-226-6384 frenc70f@erau.edu 
The study will focus on the difference between relatively low flight 
time and relatively high flight time pilots in their instrument scans, 
particularly as it relates to glass instrument flight. It will utilize 
the assets of the technically advanced aircraft performance (TAAP) lab 
(LB374) simulators to establish the procedures and metrics that will be 
transferred to the more sophisticated Flight Training Devices and then 
to actual flight (Phase II). Thus, the study will consider, transfer 
of training from flight simulators to FTD and actual flight. 
I will be expected to arrive at my scheduled time over the 4 days in 
which I am a participant in the evaluation of instrument scan. The 
total time I will be needed should not exceed 2 hours the first day and 
1.5 hours the 2-4th day. I will be asked to fly a C-182 simulator for 
about 30-50 minutes and to fill out questionnaires for the remaining 
time each day. All my results will be kept confidential and will not 
be associated with my name. I will be paid $150 for my participation 
in the study. 
The individual above, or their research assistants, have explained the 
purpose of the study, the procedures to be followed, and the expected 
duration of my participation. Possible benefits of the study have been 
described, as have alternative procedures, if such procedures are 
applicable and available. 
I WILL NOT DISCUSS THE METHODS OR CONDITIONS I EXPERIENCE WITH OTHER 
PILOTS WHO MIGHT THEMSELVES BECOME PARTICIPANTS AS THIS COULD INFLUENCE 
THEIR PERFORMANCE ADVERSELY. 
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional 
information regarding the study and that any questions I have raised 
have been answered to my full satisfaction. Furthermore, I understand 
that I am free to withdraw consent at any time and to discontinue 
participation in the study without prejudice to me. 
Finally, I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the 
consent form. I sign it freely and voluntarily. A copy has been given 
to me. 
Name (please print) : Date : 
(Participant) 
Signed: 
(Participant) 
Signed: 
(Researcher/Assistant) 
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Appendix B: Demographic Data Flight Performance I 
DDFP-I 
Demographics Data Flight Performance I 
Thank you for participating in this evaluation. This form asks questions about your 
piloting and computer experience. We will use this information to determine any factors 
that might explain your proficiency in technologically advanced aircraft (TAA). Please 
answer the following questions: 
1. Name: 
2. Sex: M F 
3. Age: 
4. Flight Licenses and certificates achieved: 
(List each, the approximate date achieved, and years held, and if current. Use 
additional paper if more room is needed.) 
License/Certificate Date achieved Years held Current? 
Yes/NO 
5. Please list any recurrency training you've received and the date. 
6. Please list the types of aircraft you've flown general aviation and commercial 
(FAA categories), and approximate dates and hours in each. 
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7. Please list the types of military aircraft you've flown and approximate dates and 
hours in each. 
8. Approximate number of hours flown in VFR 
9. Approximate number of hours flown in IFR 
10. Approximate number of hours flown in TAA or (Technologically advanced 
aircraft; i.e., "glass cockpit") like the Garmin 1000. 
11. What types of glass instruments have you flown with? 
12. List the airplanes you own or have owned (partnership or sole owner). 
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Appendix C: Federal Aeronautical Decision Making / Judgment Questionnaire 
DM/JQ: 
Adapted From: Driskill, W.E., Weissmuller, J.J., Quebe, J.C., Hand, D.K. and Hunter, D.R (1998). 
Evaluating the decision making skills of general aviation pilots. DOT/FAA/AM-98/7 
This questionnaire is designed to assess pilot decision making and judgment. Please read 
each of the following descriptions and indicate the risk of each option. Assume the 
aircraft is a TAA. 
1. You are flying an "Angel Flight" with a nurse and non-critical child patient to meet an 
ambulance at a downtown regional airport. You filed VFR it is 11:00 P.M. on a clear 
night when at 60 NM out you notice the ammeter reading zero and correctly deduce the 
alternator has failed. Your best guess is that you have from 15 to 30 minutes of battery 
power remaining. How likely are you to do the following? 
a. Declare an emergency, turn off all electrical 
systems except for NAVCOM and transponder 
and continue to the Regional Airport as planned. 
b. Declare an emergency and divert to the 
Planter's County Airport which is clearly visible 
at 2 o'clock, 7 NM. 
c. Declare an emergency, turn off all electrical 
systems except for 1 NAVCOM, instrument 
panel lights intercom and transponder and divert 
to the Southside Business Airport which is 40 
NM straight ahead. 
d. Declare art emergency, turn off all electrical 
systems except for 1 NAVCOM, instrument 
panel light intercom and transponder and divert 
to Draper Air Force Base which is 10 o'clock at 
32 NM. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Airport 
Regional 
Planters County 
SouOisidc Business 
Draper AFB 
' Ruaway 
8800x150 
7753x150 
3200x75 
m5xi00 
4129x100 
11500x300 
24hr Tow*r 
y « 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
ARSA 
Yes 
No 
YCI 
Na 
Lifted 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
TdcplKw&e 
Avftllsbte 
Yd 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Maintenance 1 
24 hrs 
O70O-18QO 
070Q-1&GO 
None 
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2. You are preparing to enter the VFR traffic pattern at the Regional Airport and hear 
the tower report winds from 280 at 15 knots ATC is vectoring traffic to the primary 
8800 ft runways 35. A Piper Cherokee asks to use the 7753x150 runway 27. The 
Cherokee is told the runway is not active, but to you it looks OK. You decide to: 
a. Accept clearance to runway 35 and 
follow the traffic. 
b. Ask to use runway 27. 
c. Insist on using runway 27 stating that 
the crosswinds are unsafe for you to use 
runway 35. 
d. Divert to the Southside Business 
Airport where the runway is almost 
directly aligned with the wind. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
3. To prepare for when marginal VFR weather makes it difficult to return to your home 
airfield (uncontrolled), you practice in VFR conditions: 
a. An unofficial locally devised arrival 
to the pattern. 
b. Have devised your own arrival route 
to the pattern or runway. 
c. Practice a published IFR approach. 
d. Don't do anything. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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4. While en route you want to find out what is going on along the weather pattern you 
observe ahead. You decide to: 
a. Call an airport tower below and ask. 
b. Call FSS and ask. 
c. Find the ATC frequency, call and 
ask them. 
d. Identify an airplane ahead and ask 
for a PIREP. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5. The weather is stuck in the summertime high mode with clear mornings, hazy 
afternoons, puffy clouds scattered at 5500 feet AGL with visibility at 7 miles or more. 
When you go cross country in these weather conditions you usually decide to: 
a. Don't file but fly airways. 
b. File VFR and stay off airways. 
c. File IFR 
d. File VFR on airways as much as 
possible. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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6. Take-off and en route weather arc VFR with a dry line scheduled through your 
destination about your ETA. It may push some thunderstorms ahead of it so your weather 
briefing ends with "VFR flight is not recommended" There are several good alternate 
airfields along the route of flight and beyond your destination. You decide to: 
a. File IFR and utilize weather radar on board 
b. File VFR to an airport short of your 
destination, land and let any weather pass over. 
c. Delay your departure until the "VFR flight is 
not recommended" statement is removed from 
the forecast. 
d. File VFR to your destination. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
7. The weather for departure and the first half of your four hour cross country was 
slightly better than marginal VFR You made it off and have leveled at cruise altitude in 
VFR conditions and are preparing to cheek in with Flight Watch You suspect they will 
ask you for a PIREP to check their forecast. You decide to: 
a. Calculate your drift, determine the 
winds, make note of the cloud cover and 
types, and note the OAT to be ready when 
they ask. 
b. Beg off- telling them you have your 
hands full and can't take the time. 
c. Expect to give at least your position, 
cloud bases and tops, visibility and relate 
any deviations between what you saw and 
what was forecast. 
d. Prepare to either confirm the accuracy of 
their forecast or tell of the observable 
differences. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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8. You have planned a four plus hour cross-country and the weather could easily force 
you into rather undesirable routes which would take you over rough and desolate country. 
To match the best weather and route combination, you decide to: 
1 a. Select the route with which you feel the 
most comfortable and have the weather 
forecaster give you the forecast and if VFR is 
not recommended, repeat this process until 
you have a VFR route. 
1 b. Tell the forecaster your departure point, 
destination and have him select the best 
route. 
c. Give the forecaster three routes and have 
him give you the weather for each then you 
decide. 
d. Delay the flight until you get VFR weather 
over the primary route. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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9. Three of your closest friends have bought you a choice ticket and are paying for you to 
rent this airplane and fly the four of you the 180 miles up to the university in the morning 
for the "BIG" early afternoon football game, then back in the early evening. Another 
friend will meet you at the college Airport and drive all of you to the game and back. 
Departure weather was overcast 3000 ft ceiling with 5 miles and light haze with 
temperatures in the 60s. Pilots flying the same route reported enroute weather as 
occasional 1500 ft ceilings with 3 miles visibility and scattered showers. The College 
Airport is clear with bright sunshine. Forty-five miles from the College Airport you have 
descended to 1000 feet staying just below the ceilings and encounter rain dropping 
visibility to under 3 miles. The terrain is flat farmland with no published obstacles above 
250 ft tall. You decide to: 
a. Remain under the clouds, keep visual 
contact with the ground and scoot through. 
b. Do a 180 and return home. 
c. Divert to the Madison County Airport 
located at 7 o'clock 50 NM and wait for the 
worst weather to pass. 
d. Put it to a vote. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Auport 
college Auport 
Maciiccn Coinry Auport 
Runway 
fCOOxlCO 
4099x109 
JSCOx'5 
Tower 
24 Hb 
None 
ARSA 
No 
No 
Lighted 
F.imwav 
Ye; 
Yes 
Telephone 
Available 
Yes 
Yes 
Maintenance 
24 hr, 
N:ce 
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10. You are halfway in a two-hour late evening flight from the Regional Airport cruising 
at 4500 feet over a route with an MEA of 1500 feet. The weather has been clear as 
forecast when without any warning you find yourself in a cloud. You are not instrument 
rated. You decide to: 
a. Continue straight ahead for a while and see what 
happens. 
b. Make a 180-degree level turn and get out. 
c. Start a wings level shallow descent to get under 
it. 
d. Start a wings level climb to get on top. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
11. It had rained all day, but the font pushed south of you and cleared the skies. You are 
out with two friends on a sight seeing trip to the hills 40 miles away and plan to be back 
before dark. With sunset still an hour away you notice ground fog beginning to form. 
You decide to: 
a. Apply full power and race back to the 
home Airport. 
b. Call Flight Watch and cruise back home. 
c. Call on your home airfield's CATF to 
see if anyone is there and can tell you what 
the weather is doing. 
d. Go directly to an Airport you know is 
closer than your home Airport, land and 
find out what the weather is doing. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
63 
The Influence of Motivation 64 
12. You are VFR at 5500' MSL, in your new SR22, completed an instrument proficiency 
check two years ago, have three actual instrument approaches and two simulated 
instrument approaches in the past six calendar months, holding procedures two months 
ago, and practiced intercepting and tracking courses this month. You inadvertently enter 
IMC. 
a. Contact center and request an IFR 
clearance and continue to your planned 
destination. 
b. Enter a 30° bank turn to make a 180° 
heading change to exit IMC conductions. 
c. Establish straight and level flight, engage 
the autopilot to hold Heading and Altitude, 
reset the Heading to initiate 180° turn. 
d. Contact center and request an IFR 
clearance and request a 180° heading 
change to exit IMC conductions. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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13. You are VFR at 7500'MSL, in your SR22, returning to Duluth for a recurrent 
training course, proceeding GPS direct from KGFK (Grand Forks, ND) to KDLH (Duluth 
Intl) with vectors to ILS09 (PYKLA transition). 60nm west of Duluth you see a line of 
thunderstorm running from just south of your route of flight toward the northeast moving 
northeast. You disengage the autopilot and turn to a heading of 130° to maneuver to the 
south of the thunderstorms, after 15 minutes ATC advises you that a thunderstorm is 
moved toward Duluth from the southwest. 
a. Continue on you current heading for another 
10 miles and then proceed direct to PYKLA and 
hold until the thunderstorm is out of the Duluth 
area. 
b. Engage autopilot, select nearest airport page 
on your GNS430, select KGPZ and search for 
needed information on Grand Rapids, MN and 
select an available approach. Choose and 
program GNS430 for coupled approach into 
KGPZ. 
c. Press the Direct function on your GNS430, 
enter KGPZ, turn the airplane to the DTK 
course displayed, once established inbound to 
KGPZ, press PROC and select an approach to 
Grand Rapids, MN. 
d. Engage autopilot, select nearest airport page 
on your GNS430, select desired airport, select 
Direct function to that airport, search for needed 
information and approach options, program 
approach, select, and activate appropriate leg. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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14. You are IFR proceeding direct to PYKLA (FAF for the ILS rwy 09 at KDLH) with 
the autopilot on with NAV and ALT functions on and you have GPS2 set in PFD Nav 
Source when the PDF fails. 
a. Regain aircraft control using the backup 
instruments, turn off the autopilot, and declare 
an emergency and request radar vectors to 
PYKLA from Minneapolis Cntr. 
b. Regain aircraft control using the backup 
instruments, turn off the autopilot, and request 
radar vectors to PYKLA from Minneapolis Cntr. 
Select desired approach and appropriate 
VOR/LOC frequencies. 
c. Regain aircraft control using the backup 
instruments, select NAV page 1 for course 
guidance to PYKLA on GPS2, select FPL, 
PYKLA, and Direct on GPS1 and activate, 
select AP, NAV, ALT on the autopilot, advise 
Minneapolis Cntr you have lost your primary 
flight instruments, now program GPS1 for 
desired approach and appropriate VOR/LOC 
frequencies. 
d. Regain aircraft control using the backup 
instruments, select Direct on GPS1, enter 
PYKLA and activate, select AP, NAV, ALT on 
the autopilot, advise Minneapolis Cntr you have 
lost your primary flight instruments, now 
program GPS1 with desired approach and 
appropriate VOR/LOC frequencies. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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15. You are IMC on an IFR flight to Duluth, when the attitude data is replaced with a 
large red X, the Wind vector data is replaced with dashes, and heading data is replaced 
with a large red X. You correctly identify the PFD is not receiving valid attitude and 
heading data. 
1 a. Use your back-up instruments for attitude 
and heading for the remainder of the flight, 
use the MFD to navigate to VMC conditions, 
and land at an airport 10 miles from your 
planned destination. 
1 b. Use your back-up instruments for attitude 
and heading for the remainder of the flight, use 
your GPS 1 to navigate to your destination, and 
flytheGPS21 approach. 
1 c. Use your back-up instruments for attitude 
and heading for the remainder of the flight, use 
the GPS1 or GPS2 to navigate to VMC 
conditions, and land at the nearest airport. 
d. Use your back-up instruments for attitude 
and heading for the remainder of the flight, use 
the GPS1 to navigate to VMC conditions, 
select the GPSS mode and autopilot, and land 
at the nearest VMC airport. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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16. You are IMC on an IFR flight to Duluth, when the heading data is replaced with a 
large red X and the Wind vector data is replaced with dashes. You correctly identify the 
PFD is not receiving valid heading data. 
a. Use your back-up instruments for 
heading for the remainder of the flight, 
use the GPS1 to navigate to your 
planned destination, select the GPSS 
mode and autopilot, and land using the 
desired approach. 
b. Use your back-up instruments for 
heading for the remainder of the flight, 
use the MFD to navigate to VMC 
conditions, and land at nearest VMC 
airport. 
c. Use your back-up instruments for 
heading for the remainder of the flight, 
use your GPS2 to navigate to your 
destination, and fly the GPS21 
approach. 
d. Use your back-up instruments for 
heading for the remainder of the flight, 
use the GPS1 or GPS2 to navigate to 
VMC conditions, and land at the 
nearest airport. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
17. You just departed Colorado Springs to the West. You are fully loaded and in solid 
IMC with freezing drizzle. As you climb ATC gives you a vector to intercept the airway 
and maintain 7,000 for traffic. On reaching altitude you are concerned about the rising 
terrain. You call departure control and ask when you can expect to climb. There is no 
response. Anti-Ice System has been on since take off. 
a. Switch on the TKS de-ice system, squawk 
7600, and continue as per your flight plan. 
b. Declare an emergency and return to Colorado 
Springs. 
c. Trouble-shoot the radio 
d. Squawk 7700 and divert to your alternate. 
e. Switch on the TKS de-ice system and divert 
to your alternate. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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18. ATIS is reporting below minimums at your destination and you are given holding 
instructions with an EFC time one hour away. You estimate that you have fuel for one 
hour and 15 minutes on board. Your passenger insists that you hold as long as you can 
because he has an appointment that he cannot afford to miss. 
a. Ask ATC for priority. 
b. Call Flight Watch on 122.0 for additional 
weather in the area before making any 
decision. 
c. Enter the hold and hope that ATC can 
work you in sooner than the EFC time. 
d. Request clearance to your alternate 
Highly 
Unlikely 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
19. After holding for 15 minutes you elect to proceed to your alternate, which is 45 
minutes away and is reporting VMC. You receive a clearance and depart the hold. ATC 
calls you 15 minutes after you leave the hold to tell you that Approach has an open slot 
and could take you now if you would like to return. 
1 a. You accept the offer and are given a vector 
for the Approach. 
1 b. You are cutting it too close and elect to 
proceed to your alternate 
c. You ask for vectors to a closer airport. 
d. You ask ATC to stand-by while you 
review the situation and your status before 
making a final decision. 
Highly 
Unlikely 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Highly 
Likely 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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Appendix D: Early Weather Scenario 
KDAB-KGNV VFR 
42 minute flight and weather was encountered 12 minutes into flight 
Simulator Settings: 
MFD declutter -2 
TOPO: OFF 
TERRAIN: ON 
SET PFD NAV to NAV 1 
360 HSI 
DME: ON 
BRGl:ON 
SET ENGINE DISPLAY ON MFD 
The investigator briefed the participant as follows: 
1. You are departing KDAB on a VFR flight to KGNV. You are delivering organs 
from Halifax hospital, to the University of Florida for a liver transplant. 
2. You have planned to go VFR at 4500 (see page 3) feet with flight following. The 
forecasted weather along the route is VFR. Your call sign is "Riddle Life Flight 
321". 
3. You are unable to program anything on neither the MFD nor the PFD but you can 
use the VOR navigation aides. 
4. A sectional of Jacksonville will be provided to you in the simulator. 
Departure time 1400z 
KDAB 011353Z 29013KT 10SM SCT080 23/15 A29.92 
KGNV011353Z 21012KT9SM SCT012 BKN070 23/21 A29.92 
Initial Conditions: 
Aircraft running on Runway 25 at KDAB 
Weather set to match ATIS at KDAB 
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Daytona Beach ATIS information: 
KDAB A TIS information Alpha 
1353 Zulu Observation 
Wind 290 at 13 
Visibility 10 
Ceiling 8000 scattered 
Temperature 23, dew point 15 
Altimeter 29.92 
Landing and departing runways 25R and 25L 
Contact clearance delivery on 119.3 prior to taxi 
Advise on initial contact you have information Alpha 
Riddle Life Flight 321, Daytona Beach Clearance. Maintain VFR at or below 3000 
Departure Frequency 125.8, squawk 1234 
Riddle Life Flight 321, runway 25R. Maintain runway heading. Cleared for takeoff 
Start timer to measure total flight time and time of weather events. 
Passing 800 feet— Riddle Life Flight 321, turn right heading 290, contact departure. 
Riddle Life Flight 321, radar contact. Climb to requested altitude, resume own 
navigation to Gainesville. 
10 minutes after takeoff 
Riddle Life Flight 321, contact Jacksonville center on 125.30 
Riddle Life Flight, roger radar contact. Maintain VFR proceed to Gainesville. 
We are now simulating radio transmitter failure. When the participant makes radio 
calls to ATC the person acting like ATC will ignore these calls, but continue to make 
radio transmissions to other traffic. 
Make random radio transmissions to other traffic throughout the rest of the flight. 
Subject recognizes lost communications after minutes MIN 
Gradual degradation of weather: 
1. 12 minutes after departure lower in-flight visibility to 5 miles in haze and ceiling 
to 5000 (5/8) broken cloud base 
2. 13 minutes after departure change ceiling at from 5000 (5/8) broken cloud base to 
5000 (6/8) broken cloud base. 
3. 14 minutes after departure lower in-flight visibility to 3 miles and ceiling to 5000 
(7/8) broken cloud base. 
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ATIS only receivable after passing Palatka (28J) 
He should be about 25 miles or less from GNV when he calls for ATIS. 
Once pilot dials in ATIS 127.15 you can make this reading. 
KGNV ATIS 
Information Bravo 
1443 Zulu Special observation 
Wind 290 at 13 
Visibility 4BR, -SHRA SA Y 4mile visibility and mist and for Shra SA Y light rain 
and showers. 
Ceiling 1500 Broken. 7000 Overcast 
Temperature 23, dew point 23 
Altimeter 29.87 
Landing and departing runway 29 
Advise on initial contact you have information Bravo. 
Weather change when passing over Palatka: 
1. Increase in-flight visibility to 5 miles 
2. Change ceiling from 5000 (7/8) broken to 7000 overcast. 
3. Set rain to moderate. 
Weather change 10 miles from Gainesville: 
1. Add clouds at 1500 scattered. 
2. Lower visibility to 3 miles. 
Continued: 
The participant did not divert and landed at Gainesville minutes after takeoff 
Diverted: 
The participant diverted minutes after takeoff. 
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Appendix E: Late Weather Scenario 
KDAB-KGNV VFR 
42 minute flight and weather was encountered 30 minutes into flight 
Simulator Settings: 
MFD declutter -2 
TOPO: OFF 
TERRAIN: ON 
SET PFD NAV to NAV 1 
360 HSI 
DME: ON 
BRGl:ON 
SET ENGINE DISPLAY ON MFD 
The investigator briefed the participant as follows: 
1. You are departing KDAB on a VFR flight to KGNV. You are delivering organs 
from Halifax hospital, to the University of Florida for a liver transplant. 
2. You have planned to go VFR at 4500 (see page 3) feet with flight following. The 
forecasted weather along the route is VFR. Your call sign is "Riddle Life Flight 
321". 
3. You are unable to program anything on neither the MFD nor the PFD but you can 
use the VOR navigation aides. 
4. A sectional of Jacksonville will be provided to you in the simulator. 
Departure time 1400z 
KDAB 011353Z 29013KT 10SM SCT080 23/15 A29.92 
KGNV 011353Z 21012KT 9SM SCT012 BKN070 23/21 A29.92 
Initial Conditions: 
Aircraft running on Runway 25 at KDAB 
Weather set to match ATIS at KDAB 
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Daytona Beach ATIS information: 
KDAB ATIS information Alpha 
1353 Zulu Observation 
Wind 290 at 13 
Visibility 10 
Ceiling 8000 scattered 
Temperature 23, dew point 15 
Altimeter 29.92 
Landing and departing runways 25R and 25L 
Contact clearance delivery on 119.3 prior to taxi 
Advise on initial contact you have information Alpha 
Riddle Life Flight 321, Daytona Beach Clearance. Maintain VFR at or below 3000 
Departure Frequency 125.8, squawk 1234 
Riddle Life Flight 321, runway 25R. Maintain runway heading. Cleared for takeoff. 
Start timer to measure total flight time and time of weather events. 
Passing 800 feet— Riddle Life Flight 321, turn right heading 290, contact departure. 
Riddle Life Flight 321, radar contact. Climb to requested altitude, resume own 
navigation to Gainesville. 
10 minutes after takeoff 
Riddle Life Flight 321, contact Jacksonville center on 125.30 
Riddle Life Flight, roger radar contact. Maintain VFR proceed to Gainesville. 
We are now simulating radio transmitter failure. When the participant makes radio 
calls to ATC the person acting like ATC will ignore these calls, but continue to make 
radio transmissions to other traffic. 
Make random radio transmissions to other traffic throughout the rest of the flight. 
Subject recognizes lost communications after minutes MIN 
Gradual degradation of weather: 
1. 30 minutes after departure lower in-flight visibility to 5 miles in haze and ceiling 
to 5000 (5/8) broken cloud base 
2. 31 minutes after departure change ceiling at from 5000 (5/8) broken cloud base to 
5000 (6/8) broken cloud base. 
3. 32 minutes after departure lower in-flight visibility to 3 miles and ceiling to 5000 
(7/8) broken cloud base. 
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ATIS only receivable after passing Palatka (28J) 
He should be about 25 miles or less from GNV when he calls for ATIS. 
Once pilot dials in ATIS 127.15 you can make this reading. 
KGNV ATIS 
Information Bravo 
1443 Zulu Special observation 
Wind 290 at 13 
Visibility 4BR, -SHRA SA Y 4mile visibility and mist and for Shra SA Y light rain 
and showers. 
Ceiling 1500 Broken. 7000 Overcast 
Temperature 23, dew point 23 
Altimeter 29.87 
Landing and departing runway 29 
Advise on initial contact you have information Bravo. 
Weather change when passing over Palatka: 
1. Increase in-flight visibility to 5 miles 
2. Change ceiling from 5000 (7/8) broken to 7000 overcast. 
3. Set rain to moderate. 
Weather change 10 miles from Gainesville: 
1. Add clouds at 1500 scattered. 
2. Lower visibility to 3 miles. 
If the participant flew over Palatka before 30 minutes had passed the Palatka weather 
changes were not implemented. The participants received the weather changes 30 
minutes into the flight and if continued to the destination received the weather changes 10 
miles from Gainesville with rain set to moderate. 
Continued: 
The participant did not divert and landed at Gainesville minutes after takeoff 
Diverted: 
The participant diverted minutes after takeoff. 
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